Posts Tagged ‘Capitalism’
George Osborne Weeps: Will Thatcherism Now Die as well?
With that funeral Class Hatred came back yesterday.
David Cameron boasted that “We all Thatcherites now”.
He can say it three times but it will still not be true.
The ceremony was said to be truly moving magnificent .
For all the grandeur, they claimed a simple purpose. They had come, they said, not to bury a political figure or an “-ism”, but a woman of flesh and blood, a mortal who was “one of us”. And yet there were moments when it seemed they had come to bury an entire era, to conclude at last that dizzying, turbulent decade where she reigned supreme. The ceremony that hushed central London on Wednesday morning was a farewell to Margaret Thatcher – but also to the 1980s.
The sight of so many grasping, grudging, gruesome, mean-spirited, mean-minded, and mean-intentioned mourners stirred up great feelings of class loathing across the country.
Sharp divisions sprang up again, as if they had never gone away.
Thatcher was “one of them“.
The Liberal-Tory Coalition is trying to complete the ‘Thatcher Revolution’ by destroying everything that remains of social democracy, equality and care for others.
Instead of collective pride in our common wealth, they promote the private richess of the few.
Instead of joyful unity between people they bring hatred and fear of the many, the poor and migrants,
On the television a succession of admirers of Thatcher have paraded their own merits.
They have done down the efforts of those who have not benefited from the market.
This is a different picture that will remain seared on our minds,
An Effigy of Margaret Thatcher (‘Thatcher the Scab’) is burnt in the former Mining Village of Goldthorpe.
Against fear and hatred the left can build something new.
Sisters, Brothers, Comrades – there’s a place for you: in the People’s Assembly Against Austerity!
No, directed by Pablo Larrain, brings back the politics of the1970s and the 1980s with a thump.
Chile’s in the late 1980s was a military regime. From the September 1973 coup against Socialist President Salvador Allende, Augusto Pinochet had emerged as Junta leader. The left alliance, Unidad Popular, had suffered years of brutal oppression. A pioneer of free-market economics, a more than faithful ally of the United States, the ruling Generals had received the blessing of Pope Paul ll. Their example was widely followed across Latin America.
In 1988 the regime felt confident enough to legitimise its rule by a Plebiscite. This sop the world opinion allowed the opposition to emerge and campaign against this. No narrates this contest, from inside the team that successfully challenged the dictatorship.
René Saavedera – played by rising Mexican actor Gael Garcia Bernal – is an ad-man, from a left-wing family. No revolves around his influence on the ‘No’ campaign’s communications strategy. René is determined to modernise their style. Sometimes it is not clear whether he is anything more than modernisation.
To neutralise the anti-Communist fears whipped up by the Military’s publicists he nudges and pushes the No camp towards a hopeful, forward–looking approach. With the Rainbow Logo, hHappiness, an end to fear, a joyful youthfulness, are spun into calls for freedom. As the contest runs on his own conflicts, with his regime-tied Advertising Agency Boss, Lucho Guzman. His former wife, a good-hearted left activist, and his young son, are drawn into the drama as the heat rises against anybody on the ‘No’ side.
The bleached out colours, the Big Hair, the Dynasty couture and toned bodies of the actors, remind you that we are definitely not in the present. René’s ex-wife remarks that in Chile, where people are largely small and dark, there are not many of these Danish giants.
No gives a place to those on the left determined to keep this memory alive. They do not come over easily, or at all, to the new style. But their sombre, emotional, television spots are pushed aside as the broadcasting business gets underway.
One side of the picture has rankled Many feel that it was not by advertising alone that they won the vote, the opposition campaign on the ground, grass-roots led, was decisive. Others have pointed to Larrin’s own family. His parents, Herman and Magdalena, are on the Chilean hard-right.
Perhaps it is true that the director’s own forays into advertising shaped the film. But the viewer is left with little doubt about the regime’s viciousness. And who can not share the joy in the film as the Victory of the NO camp comes through?
The long period of Chilean dictatorship took place in the country long renowned for its democratic institutions. No amount of whataboutery can minimise the suffering of the Chilean opposition. The tortures and deaths they suffered were compounded by the misery into which large parts of the population were plunged by liberal economics.
Such was the shock of the Chilean coup that the European Social Democratic, Socialist and Communist Parties in the 1970s were deeply affected by it. Some called for democratically elected left governments to remove any such military threat by smashing the power of the armed forces. Others, famously in the Italian Communist Party (PCI), developed the theory of a “historical compromise” so wide that an electoral victory could not be contested by force.
Things have changed. The horizon of the left is narrower. It’s not a transition to socialism that’s on the cards, but a transition from liberal economics. This includes Chile, where the military influence remained institutionalised long after the No’s victory and the free-marketeers continue to dominate.
One might ask whether a campaign to free our countries today from the hate and misery of this economics of despair would be improved through the kind of hopeful calls for a better future that No brings to life.
Review: From the Ruins of Empire. The Revolt against the West and the Remaking of Asia. Pankaj Mishra. Allen Lane 2012.
Western colonial history is a popular section in bookshops. Attacks on Empire, and modern day Imperialism, are widespread on the left. But the history of the non-Western intelligentsia’s tangled and complex relation with the West is no so well known. Pankaj Mishra’s Ruins of Empire fills a gap for the wider reading public. Mishra appears on the left by beginning from the way the East was “subjugated by the people of the West that they had long considered upstarts, if not barbarians.” (Page 3)But he draws much wider conclusions, decidedly not left-wing, from biographical accounts of how “intelligent and sensitive people” in the East responded to the ‘West’s’ impact on their societies.
Intellectuals, notably Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, the Chinese reformer Liang Qichao, and – to a lesser extent – Rabindranath Tagore, are brought to the fore. They were both ‘modernisers’, wanting to change, and defenders of their cultures against the West. Others appear, Indian nationalists like Subhas Chandra Bose and Japanese writers, like Tokutomio Soho. This has the great merit of making these important voices heard. It has the great disadvantage of pinning a great deal of speculation about the shaping of the modern world on the – often extremely general – ideas clustered around these figures. It could be said that Soho, who moved from Western liberalism to unabashed champion of Japanese self-interest, illustrates Mishra’s main claim: the primacy of the Asian Cause against the ‘West’.
1905 Russian Humiliation.
Mishra begins with a flourish. The 1905 defeat of the Russian navy by Japan in 1905 in the Tsushima Strait. The rout of the Tsarist fleet, he says, reverberated around the East. “For many other non-white people, Russia’s humiliations seemed to negate the West’s racial hierarchies, mocking the European presumption to ‘civilise’ the supposedly ‘backward’ countries.”(Page 3) Ghandi, and Mustafa Kemal, to cite but two, were “ecstatic” at the news.
Like the spark that lit the prairie the effects were far-reaching. For nationalists, from Egypt to China, passing by Bengal and Vietnam’s “scholar gentry”, Japan became the symbol of successful resistance to Western Empire building. It gave rise to “A hundred fantasies – of national freedom, racial dignity, or simple vengefulness.”(Ibid) Modernisation could, it seemed, take another guise than a European one.
Mishra side-steps the effect of the defeat on Tsarism, – the 1905 Russian Revolution – the precursor of 1917. This perhaps would have some impact on European imperialism (and the use of the word itself). Anti-colonialism in the later 20th century would be incomprehensible without assessing the role not just of Soviet – Stalinist- Communism as a “messianic doctrine” but a political force. Mishra largely jumps over this, referring – mentions of Mao aside – to the post-1989 era when Marxism-Leninism is “discredited”.
The Western colonial empires were “wholly unprecedented in creating global hierarchy of economic, physical and cultural power through their outright conquest or ‘informal’ empires, of free trade and unequal treaties.”(Page 42) By the mid-19th century they had pushed back the Ottoman Empire, invaded North Africa, made inroads in China, and The sense of European racial superiority – which Mishra demonstrates infected even Woodrow Wilson while pontificating on the rights of nations to self-determination – cast a long shadow.
Subjected peoples were ‘humiliated’. The basis of their civilisations was undermined. Muslims felt, Mishra says, felt that the “cosmic order” had been disrupted. A rival that made them seem outdated and incapable threatened the ancient bureaucratic and literary culture of China.
Ruins of Empire portrays those who tried to grapple with this. There are sketches of Tagore’s complex reflections on Bengali and Indian culture faced with the British Raj, There is Liang Qichao who looked to a new China, and became disillusioned with the West after visiting an unequal America.
But it is the Persian born, wandering intellectual, Al-Afghani (1838 – 1897), who grabs most attention. He argued “the Islamic world needed a Reformation, preferably with himself as the new Luther.”(Page 83) In a variety of forms he advocated a “strong Islamic centre that would beat back the encroaching West.”(Page 89) He fiercely defended the place of scientific and technical knowledge in this renewal.*
Politics of the ‘Anti-West’.
What kind of politics did these figures foreshadow? It is had to tie them – with the very partial exception of Al-Afghani – to any specific party or state. Liang Qichao was pushed aside by Sun Yat Sen, Tagore was a respected poet and writer, but no politician. His wary attitude towards nationalism and reluctance to be politically manipulated were notorious. Al-Afghani seems at different times to be a hard-line (proto) Islamist and an almost liberal modernist. One wonders how exactly their contribution to the ‘shaping of the modern world’ can be gauged.
The reactions against the West, nationalism, and Eastern modernisation – in short the introduction of a full-blown capitalist system in these immense parts of the world – form a vastly complicated history. Mishra, as an essayist, and, biographer, is not obliged to over more than aspects of this. Nor does he disuss what Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit call in Occidentalism (2004) critics of the West in Europe itself and the impact these had on Asia. What he does it to look through one angle: the rise of ‘anti-Western’ types of modernisation.
After the Great War, when nationalists and anti-colonialists began to have an impact on Asia, Mishra notes the eclipse of liberal democratic thought. Japan, he considers, continued to be a pole of attraction. It was modern, with successful industry and a rising living standards. It was also very authentic – pure – and Japanese, or at least as the majority of the governing class considered it to be. It had admirers across Asia. The authoritarian ‘pan-Asian’ movements became, in their Japanese form, at least according to the Japanese Soho, a racial struggle. As war began he stated, “We must shows to the races of East Asia that the order, tranquillity, peace, happiness and contentment of East Asia can be gained only by eradicating the vile precedent of the encroachment and extortion of the Anglo-Saxons in East Asia.”(Page 247)
The unattractive history of Japanese militarism – which throve on the crushing of the country’s democratic ‘Western’ and indigenous intelligentsia and popular movements – is given favourable treatment. Mishra offers a version of history in which Japan’s invasions and punitive expeditions during the Second World War had some justification. There was, “Revenge for decades of racial humiliation motivated many Japanese un the battlefield.”(Page 247) The never-colonised Japan backed nationalists against the Europeans by running their conquered territories with some help from them.
The initial co-operation between nationalists, in Burma and elsewhere, and Japan illustrates the ‘Co-Prosperity’ Japanese Empire’ was an important movement n the fight for independence in Asia. One would be more satisfied if the influence of the ideas of national independence were explored in more details, The Indian Congress Party, to cite but one case, had support, even founders, amongst the British intelligentsia.
To take a couple of significant cases. Can one say that the Vietnamese, Laos or Chinese Communist Parties took on Marxist language purely to express national demands? The class struggles, the land reforms, the nationalisations, the political upheavals and horrors of these countries – not to mention Cambodia – have their own national histories. But Communism, with its impact across Asia, right to Indonesia and the Philippines, and India as well, which was and is always a global movement, fits askew from Mishra’s simple thrust: the ‘humiliation’ by the West and the ‘revenge’ of the East.
Islamism as the Anti-West.
The rise of Islamism is treated in terms of revenge for ‘humiliation. It has deep roots, perhaps in the human condition and the source of faith itself. Al-Afghani is praised for stating, “a totally secular society – the dream of nineteenth century rationalism – was doomed to remain a fantasy in the West as well as in the Muslim world.”(Page 102) Islam, it turned out, could spearhead an Anti-Western revolt, or at least in the late 1970s. “It is largely due to the Islamic revolution that today the basic principles of the first Muslim Westernised elites – that development entails the rejection of Islamic values in favour of Western ones – lie discredited from Tunisia to Xinjianh, and that Islam continues to serve as a focal point of resistance to authorities regimes in the Muslim world.”(Page 277)
Yet Mishra is less than favourable to the ‘authoritarian’ Islamic political regimes created in the wake of the Iranian Revolution. Instead he looks to Turkey, “Turkey’s success confirms the validity of an ‘Islamic’ solution to the problem of adapting to Western modernisation, and the geopolitical implications of this unique achievement are immense.”(Page 285) This takes some beating. In what sense can the post-Atatürk regimes, the foundation no doubt of whatever success Turkey enjoys, be awarded to ‘Islam’? How exactly? Does the Qur’an run a state? Do the AK MPs’ prayers bolster economic growth? What of its failures? Do the suras inspire the crack down on the free press?
Mishra has written a lucid and stimulating book. We are better off knowing more about Al-Afghani and other figures. But can one understand the world through the principle that the “aggrieved natives always wanted to beat the West at its own game”? (Page 294) The underlying ‘dialectic’ in From the Ruins of Empire rarely rises above these, and other, hackyned thoughts. There is the struggle of ‘Asians’ against the ‘whites’ the ‘Europeans’ the ‘West’. Perhaps we all look the same to him.
Worse is to come. Like John Gray, another doomsayer, Mishra ends on a portentous note. The ‘revenge of the East” which now takes the form of the purist of endless economic growth is a “fantasy”. The global environment is set for “early destruction”. It “looks set to create reveries of a nihilistic rage and disappointment among hundred of millions of have-nots – the bitter outcome of the universal triumph of Western modernity, which turns the revenge of the East into something darkly ambiguous, and all its victories truly Pyrrhic.”(Page 309 – 10)
You have to ask: were these last sentences even worth reading?
* Mishra claims that Al-Afghani challenged the French Orientalist Ernest Renan on Islam. Renan famously believed that Islam has stifled scientific and philosophical freedom – exemplified in his extensive study of the reception and prohibition of the medieval Aristotelian Arab Averroes’s teaching. The Persian pan-Islamist defended, initial Islamic openness to science. Yet while Frenchman undoubtedly had many prejudices about ‘Semitic’ languages and Islamic culture in particular it is much less sure if anybody, Al-Afghani included, could prove him wholly wrong. Islamic authorities did persecute Averroes in Spain, and a much wider intolerance of philosophical heterodoxy was a long-standing feature of many societies based around Islam.
Thus as Al-Afghani himself noted, the issue therefore turns on a more general question of how religions relate to philosophy and science.
“Je plaide ici auprès de M. Renan, non la cause de la religion musulmane, mais celle de plusieurs centaines de millions d’hommes qui seraient ainsi condamnés à vivre dans la barbarie et l’ignorance ».
« Personne n’ignore, que le peuple arabe, alors qu’il était dans l’état de barbarie, s’est lancé dans la voie des progrès intellectuels et scientifiques avec une vitesse qui n’a été égalée que par la rapidité de ses conquêtes car, dans l’espace d’un siècle, il a acquis et s’est assimilé presque toutes les sciences grecques et persanes qui s’étaient développées lentement pendant des siècles sur le sol natal, comme il étendit sa domination de la presqu’île arabique jusqu’aux montagnes de l’Himalaya et au somment de Pyrénées. On peut dire que dans toute cette période les sciences firent des progrès étonnants chez les arabes et dans tous les pays soumis à leur domination. Rome et Byzance étaient alors les sièges des sciences théologiques et philosophiques ainsi que le centre lumineux et comme le foyer ardent de toutes les connaissances humaines. »
« Toutefois il est permis de se demander comment la civilisation arabe, après avoir jeté un si vif éclat dans le monde, s’est éteinte tout à coup ; comment ce flambeau ne s’est pas rallumé depuis, et pourquoi le monde arabe reste toujours enseveli dans de profondes ténèbres. »
« Les religions, de quelque nom qu’on les désigne, se ressemblent toutes. Aucune entente ni aucune réconciliation ne sont possibles entre ses religions et la philosophie. La religion impose à l’homme sa foi et sa croyance, tandis que la philosophie l’en affranchit totalement ou en partie. Comment veut-on dès lors qu’elles s’entendent entre elles ? Lorsque la religion chrétienne, sous les formes les plus modestes et les plus séduisantes, est entrée à Athènes et à Alexandrie qui étaient, comme chacun sait, les deux principaux foyers de la science et de la philosophie, son premier soin été, après s’être établie solidement dans ces deux villes, de mettre de côté et la science proprement dite et la philosophie, en cherchant à les étouffer l’une et l’autre sous les broussailles des discussions théologiques, pour expliquer les inexplicables mystères de la trinité, de l’incarnation et de la Transsubstantiation. Il en sera toujours ainsi. Toutes les fois que la religion aura le dessus, elle éliminera la philosophie ; et le contraire arrive quand c’est la philosophie qui règne en souveraine maîtresse. Tant que l’humanité existera, la lutte ne cessera pas entre le dogme et le libre examen, entre la religion et la philosophie, lutte acharnée et dans laquelle, je le crains, le triomphe ne sera pas pour la libre pensée, parce que, aussi, la science, si belle qu’elle soit, ne satisfait pas complètement l’humanité qui a soif d’idéal et qui aime à planter dans des régions obscures et lointaines que les philosophes et les savants ne peuvent ni apercevoir ni explorer. »
The point Renan asked, whether Islam when it is involved with politics, to the point where a form dominates a state, can develop ways that leave other faiths – and importantly non- and anti-faiths – with an unfettered influence over political life, remains a live political issue.
This is how he put it – in extremely provocative terms that are clearly racist (evoking the, ‘l’esprit sémitique’)”
« L’islamisme (à l’époque, sens général de « religion musulmane ») ne peut exister que comme religion officielle ; quand on le réduira à l’état de religion libre et individuelle, il périra. L’islamisme n’est pas seulement une religion d’État, comme l’a été le catholicisme en France, sous Louis XIV, comme il l’est encore en Espagne, c’est la religion excluant l’État (…) Là est la guerre éternelle, la guerre qui ne cessera que quand le dernier fils d’Ismaël sera mort de misère ou aura été relégué par la terreur au fond du désert. L’islam est la plus complète négation de l’Europe ; l’islam est le fanatisme, comme l’Espagne du temps de Philippe II et l’Italie du temps de Pie V l’ont à peine connu ; L’islam est le dédain de la science, la suppression de la société civile ; c’est l’épouvantable simplicité de l’esprit sémitique, rétrécissant le cerveau humain, le fermant à toute idée délicate, à tout sentiment fin, à toute recherche rationnelle, pour le mettre en face d’une éternelle tautologie : Dieu est Dieu (…) »